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Abstract: The paper considers the problem of the integration of markets in Central Asia as a 
main factor of economic modernization. It first identifies the potential channels of reduction 
of transaction costs barriers between countries (“models of integration”). Second, it looks at 
the emergence of these channels, and identifies two main puzzles: success of centralization in 
individual countries vs. failing international cooperation among them and successful informal 
cooperation of companies and trade networks vs. deficits of intergovernmental concerted 
actions. Third, it looks at the impact of the relative success of emerging models of market 
integration for the balance of power in Central Asia. 
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1. Introduction 
 Economic development and modernization in a country or region are closely related to 
the ability to support market integration, i.e. increasing interdependence of regional and 
sectoral markets, in this particular territory. Market integration is crucial for using the 
comparative advantages, and hence, for obtaining benefits of specialization. However, 
creating integrated markets even within national borders is not a trivial task. Large markets 
are necessarily based on increasing range of (impersonal) exchange, thus requiring a sufficient 
level of institutional development on both formal and informal levels. For many emerging 
economies deficit of formal regulatory framework and of trust in the society effectively 
restrict the size of markets. The problem is obviously of great importance for the countries of 
Central Asia. On the one hand, as Linn (2009) claims, Central Asia is lagging behind in terms 
of integration in the global economy, partly simply because of its landlocked geographic 
position, but partly because of general deficit of economic integration across Eurasia. On the 
other hand, as in the most post-Soviet countries, legal markets (as opposed, of course, to 
omnipresent shadow economy and bargaining on administrative markets) are a relatively 
recent phenomenon, thus of course often lacking the necessary institutional infrastructure. 
 Borders of market, as well as borders of organization, are determined by the level of 
transaction costs. Market disintegration usually results from high costs of interregional and 
international economic exchange; the nature of barriers between territories (which often 
coincide with formal international borders, but may in fact be quite different from them) 
varies, but may be related to bad protection of property rights and contracts, low level of trust, 
cultural differences, as well as formal protectionist measures implemented by the regional and 
national governments. Certainly, even if the costs are equal to zero, in a global economy there 
is no reason to automatically expect the intensity of economic interaction within this region to 
increase; transactions with outside regions – even in spite of possibly higher transaction costs 
– may be more attractive. However, the reduction of barriers is certainly necessary, although 
not sufficient condition for integration of markets. Hence, in order to explain the process of 
market integration one first has to identify the potential “channels” leading to reduction of 
cross-border transaction costs – both as result of intended institutional design and by-product 
of power struggles.i In what follows I will refer to these channels as “models of market 
integration”. 
 The aim of this paper is to look at different approaches and attempts to support market 
integration in Central Asia from the point of view of power balance in the region. The paper 
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considers different aspects of the market integration, both within and across national borders. 
It seems to be quite obvious for Central Asia that restricting attention to either international or 
internal affairs cannot provide a reasonable basis for the analysis; thus one has to apply a 
framework accounting for both aspects. In fact, economic and political transition is hardly 
limited to the clear structure of a nation-state. It is much more often resulting into shifts of 
authority and economic relations both between and within states (Ananyin, 2005). Generally 
speaking, it is possible to evaluate the models of market integration using two sets of criteria. 
First, one can look at their ability to create the necessary preconditions for market integration. 
Second, it can consider, whether these preconditions turned out to be sufficient to establish 
integrated markets – or at least to support a movement towards higher market integration. It is 
plausible, that necessary and sufficient may diverge significantly. 
 To start with, most Central Asian countries still lack internal interdependence of their 
markets.ii It is particularly problematic for Kazakhstan: large dimensions of the country and 
poor quality of transportation (in particular, railroads) have been a severe problem for the 
economic development of the country (Ekspert Kazakhstan, 2007). Similar problems exist in 
other countries, like Tajikistan and Kyrgyz Republic. There is virtually no empirical research 
on market integration in Central Asian states; Brosig and Yahshilikov (2005) specifically 
looked at the integration of wheat markets across three grain trading spots, and claimed, that 
while the northern markets seem to be closely connected to each other, the link to Central 
Kazakhstan is much weaker. Anyway, it is certainly too farfetched to claim that there exists a 
system of integrated markets within Central Asian countries. In a similar way, the cross-
border market integration. Even after the initial collapse of intra-regional trade in Central Asia 
(and in the post-Soviet world in general) in the early 1990s, it is possible to claim that the 
share of trade flows between Central Asian countries in their total turnover was slowly 
declining after 1999, currently reaching the level of less than 5%. To conclude, there seems to 
be no empirical evidence supporting strong market integration in the region. 
 Hence, the models of market integration certainly are not “sufficient” to reduce 
transaction-costs barriers – with one exception discussed in what follows. However, this is 
hardly surprising given the relatively low quality of economic institutions in Central Asia and 
in fact a short time horizon for the existence of legal markets. Nevertheless, the problem still 
remains: can one (given the performance of the models so far) at least expect that some of 
them have the potential to support market integration? The issue is surely relevant for 
research, but is also of importance for policy advice: political economy is finally about 
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picking policy options given the existing constraints of implementation (Ilchmann and 
Uphoff, 1971). And from the point of view of the “necessary conditions” the models of 
integration seem to diverge significantly. This is exactly the problem which this paper aims to 
discuss. 
 
2. Models of market integration 
There are many patterns of human behavior resulting in emergence of integrated 
markets – as there is a multitude of models of market integration. For the purpose of this 
paper it is helpful to distinguish first between models based on governmental activity or on 
influence of private actors – I will refer to these two particular models as, respectively, 
regionalism and regionalization. Both terms were coined for the international relations 
discussion, but can in fact be easily adapted to similar context within individual countries. 
Governments reduce transaction costs barriers by establishing formal institutions (for 
example, protecting property rights or fighting restrictions on free trade), but also by 
providing physical infrastructure (like railroad network) in case it does not exist. The channels 
of influence of private actors are more subtle, and in fact depend upon the exact definition of 
these actors: certainly, large multinationals are different from informal trade networks. Private 
structures influence the market integration by supporting ex-post convergence of economic 
and political institutions (through both transmission of experience and practices through 
investments and establishment of trade networks; and “voting by feet” and institutional 
competition) and possibly even by providing substitutes to absent formal institutions 
supported by the government and restricting redistribution by individual governmental agents 
through collective action (Greif, 2006). Certainly, here the distinction is also not particularly 
clear, if one considers state-owned companies or businesses with close ties to public officials, 
what should be taken into consideration if Central Asia is discussed. 
Regionalism is usually based on some kind of policy centralization, when certain 
aspects of economic policy are subject to a collective decision-making mechanism or even a 
supranational institution, rather than to the discretion of individual governments. Certainly, 
regionalism may result from unilateral liberalization measures; more important, however, is 
the fact that policy centralization is also not sufficient to integrate markets, since it may be 
used in order to establish redistribution schemes. One of the most centralized countries of the 
world – North Korea – exhibits also very low level of market integration in the areas where 
markets are permitted (Seliger, 2006). However, centralization is not without influence on 
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market integration anyway. From this point of view, however, one has to distinguish between 
two forms of (de)centralization: the formal and the informal ones. Formal decentralization is 
based on the changes in the legal acts and official political structures; informal 
decentralization refers to shifts in power balance “beyond” the written constitutional texts.iii 
In fact, both formal and informal decentralization refer to different types of authority the 
centralized decision making is based upon. 
Finally, for the case of regionalism it is useful to distinguish between international and 
intranational market integration. In an international context, market integration is mostly 
driven either by voluntary cooperation of countries with relatively similar power potential, or 
by the policy of the dominant player (as it was predicted by the theories of hegemonic 
stability). In the intranational case the driving force for integration is usually the policy of the 
central government, i.e. of a specialized agency with claim to authority over the whole 
territory of a country. There is of course no clear distinction between these two forms of 
market integration, as there is no unambiguous definition of a country: in fact, centralized 
agencies (like the EU) may become important in international integration, and coalitions of 
regions and dominant regions may play an even more important role in individual countries, 
then center-periphery relations. However, in the case of Central Asia the distinction seems to 
be reasonable, as the following empirical part will demonstrate. For the regionalization the 
distinction between international and intranational arena is rather that of choice of necessary 
unit for empirical analysis than that of possibly different mechanisms; however, it also can be 
useful in the context of this study. 
 
Table 1: Framework for market integration 
 Regionalism Regionalization 
 Formal policy 
centralization 
Informal policy 
centralization 
Unilateral 
liberalization 
International Standard 
international 
regional economic 
integration 
Hegemonic stability 
and international 
hierarchies 
Open regionalism Multinationals and 
business networks 
across national 
borders 
Intranational Modern centralized 
states 
Pseudo-federalism  Multiregional 
companies and 
business networks 
within national 
borders 
 
To conclude, the framework for understanding how different forces of market 
integration work together is summarized in Table 1.iv As I have shown, it is certainly difficult 
to obtain a clear mapping from the external conditions to the outcomes of market integration, 
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since different policies of public and private agents may as well result in different outcomes; 
it makes the empirical considerations, however, even more interesting. Hence, the difference 
between performance in terms of “necessary” and “sufficient” conditions, as discussed in the 
introduction, becomes important. One should notice that the examples of market integration in 
the table are much more complex in reality, and usually include elements of several models, 
which thus should be understood as Weberian ideal types for analytical purposes. Therefore 
the most interesting question relates to how different forms of market integration influence 
each other. The advantage of Central Asia is that in this region different models of market 
integration have been implemented simultaneously, without clear pre-defined chances of 
success, given high economic interdependence and fragility of borders inherited from the 
Soviet past. Therefore one can observe the interaction of the models and make conclusions 
regarding their complementary or substitutive nature, as it will be done in the next section. 
 
3. Models of market integration in Central Asia: necessary conditions 
3.1. Internal centralization 
 As the starting point for the analysis consider the models of market integration related 
to regionalism, i.e. state-led reduction of transaction costs barriers. The option of unilateral 
opening does not seem to be really relevant for Central Asia – with possible exception of 
Kyrgyz Republic with its radical economic reforms in the early 1990s. In what follows I will 
focus on formal and informal policy centralization. Here, however, the situation seems to be 
quite different for international and internal power allocation. From the formal point of view, 
there has been both strong centralization within individual Central Asian countries and active 
attempts of cooperation across their borders. From the point of view of the formal 
decentralization, all countries of the Central Asian region are unitary: the heads of local 
administration are appointed by the central government; the governors act as representatives 
of the president and heads of regional executive, as well as often act as presidents of local 
legislatures (or propose the presidents, like in Uzbekistan). There are local elected councils at 
provincial and sub-provincial level, which are, however, virtually powerless and often 
dominated by the executive. Some Central Asian countries (Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) 
include territories with higher degree of autonomy, but even in this case their decision-making 
is limited. This system was established in most Central Asian countries immediately after 
independence, and in spite of several experiments with local self-governance in Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyz Republic, basically did not change. 
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If one looks at the informal level of power relations, however, the situation seems to 
be quite different. Here Central Asian countries follow the pattern of a “decentralization-
centralization” cycle, which has also been present in several other countries of the former 
Soviet Union.v Probably, the most straightforward example of this process is Kazakhstan. In 
the first half of the 1990s the country experienced a severe economic crisis, leading the 
regional governors to develop their own policies partly deviating from the central ones. The 
economically successful regions received a higher portion of tax revenue generated from their 
territory. The results and the mechanisms of informal decentralization in Kazakhstan were 
very similar to those observed in Russia: capture of local tax authorities, tax exemptions for 
companies for donations and inconsistent application of central regulations. However, since 
1999 economic boom and completion of the power concentration at the central level made the 
policy of recentralization possible. Indeed, the central government successfully restored 
control over informally decentralized regions using a variety of instruments – from changes in 
fiscal structure to re-drawing borders of regions, centralizing cash flows from natural 
resources and implementing more rigorous control over local officials (Cummings, 2000; 
Melvin, 2001; Jones Luong, 2004). 
The situation in smaller countries of Central Asia varies from country to country, but 
also seems to be significantly more complicated, that the simple formal analysis would 
suggest. Jones Luong (2000) documents, regardless of the degree of de-facto decentralization, the 
strong development of regional interests and political identities in the political and economic elites, 
which manifest themselves in the decision-making at the central level.vi In Kyrgyz Republic, 
weakness of the central state also provided substantial informal autonomy to the regions in the 
1990s; however, unlike Kazakhstan, the central government remained relatively weak and 
there seems to be no process of recentralization present. In Tajikistan the decentralization 
cycle took, in a certain sense, extreme forms: in the early 1990s the contradictions between 
regional elites resulted in a civil war “between regions”, which obviously led to the vacuum 
of power. Currently the increasing political stability seems to support the re-centralization 
trend, limiting the power of regional elites and increasing the impact of the center. However, 
several reports suggest that the central government still lacks control over vast areas of the 
territory because of poor infrastructure and severe economic conditions.  
The most difficult case to assess is Uzbekistan: on the one hand, unlike Kyrgyz 
Republic, the regime of Karimov was able to restrict power of local networks and thus 
develop a highly centralized political system based on omnipresent central control (Melvin, 
2001). However, traditional clans still remain important political-economic players 
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establishing their clientele networks and creating the “tacit division of major industries and 
sectors” (Gaman-Golutvina, 2007). Some empirical observations indeed show the existence of 
the exchange of loyalty of regional elites against economic privileges, which is, moreover, 
obviously different in rich and poor regions (therefore providing background for asymmetric 
decentralization, see Markovitz, 2008). Turkmenistan is probably the most centralized 
country in the region; governors are dismissed in short intervals and without any reasonable 
explanation (Leschenko and Troschke, 2006) – once again, due to the very high power 
concentration at the central level.  
 
3.2. International policy coordination 
 If one looks at the international policy coordination, the situation until the early 2000s 
seems to be relatively similar to the internal one. On the one hand, Central Asian countries 
have been quite active in terms of creating of regional networks of integration agreements, 
which currently covers a variety of institutions with different modes of functioning and 
responsibilities. First, countries of the region (and, particularly, Kazakhstan, but also Kyrgyz 
Republic and Tajikistan) belong to the main proponents of the so-called post-Soviet 
integration process, based on closer economic cooperation of the former Soviet republics. 
Thus, the countries of the region participate in the Economic Union of the CIS Countries, 
Eurasian Development Bank and Eurasian Economic Community. Second, Central Asia is 
actively involved in regional integration in the “greater Central Asia” area, covering both 
former Soviet republics and other countries: examples include Economic Cooperation 
Organization, as well as the projects of SPECA, CSATTF and CARES, established by 
international organizations (UNECE and ADB, respectively). Third, Central Asian countries 
belong to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which also includes a substantial economic 
agenda (Linn and Pidufala, 2009).  
Finally, there have been several attempts to foster integration among Central Asian 
countries. The first project involving the countries of Central Asia was the Central Asian 
Union, established by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan in 1994. In 1998 
Tajikistan was formally admitted to the Union, and in 2001 the structure was renamed as the 
Organization of Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC). After Russia joined the OCAC, the 
organization was merged with the EAEC (which seemed to be a reasonable decision, given 
the relatively short participation of Uzbekistan in the EAEC, which made the membership of 
both structures completely overlapping). However, the idea of a Central Asian Union is still 
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part of the agenda of the main players in the region. While the old OCAC failed to function 
also because of the rivalry between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, in the new round of 
negotiations Kazakhstan became the main promoter of the institutionalized regional 
integration. In 2007 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic agreed on establishing an institutional 
framework for the bilateral agreement between these two countries – an initiative considered 
to be the first step towards a new regional integration project. Tajikistan is also considered to 
be a potential partner in the new structure (Zhugan, 2007). 
However, as in case of internal centralization, for the international policy coordination 
the distinction between formal and informal interaction becomes really important. In the 
1990s in fact both international and internal policy coordination seem to follow the same 
pattern. The well-developed formal institutional framework contradicted the de-facto 
decentralization within the countries and absence of international cooperation between 
countries. There seems to be very little – if any – concerted action of countries in terms of 
economic policy; even the simplest form of cooperation – that necessary to maintain effective 
free-trade areas, which exist in the region on both multilateral and bilateral level (Kort and 
Dragneva, 2006), or to support coordination in the crucial common pool resources like water 
or electricity – seems to face substantial difficulties. However, unlike internal 
decentralization, which in most cases was replaced by higher centralization in turn of the 
“decentralization-centralization” cycle, the international policy coordination seems to be as 
limited now as it was ten years ago. One should notice that already in the 1990s the countries 
more successful in terms of internal centralization (Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) were also 
less interested in developing international cooperation. However, in the 2000s the divergence 
became obvious: the development of the “necessary” preconditions for market integration in 
the domestic and in the international framework diverged substantially. 
 
3.3. Regionalization 
 If one looks at the market integration driven by private actors, the situation, however, 
seems to differ substantially. It is particularly relevant for the international dimension: the 
virtually absent real regionalism (with an abundance of formal regionalism projects without 
any steps towards implementation) since mid-2000s co-exists with relatively vivid 
regionalization process. There are two main driving forces to be mentioned. First, Central 
Asian regionalization is based on increasing activities of multinationals from Kazakhstan, 
which became one of the main centers of the outward FDI in the post-Soviet space 
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(compatible to Russia). This process is particularly important for Kyrgyz Republic and – to 
some extend – to Tajikistan, where, however, Russian investors remain the dominant group. 
Even according to official statistical data, Kazakhstan is currently the leading foreign investor 
in Kyrgyz Republic; its share in the FDI inflow increased from 8.9% in 2004 over 19.2% in 
2005, 40.7% in 2006 and 41.8% in 2007 to 51.1% in 2008. However, a well-known feature of 
investment interaction in Central Asia and in the post-Soviet world in general is that the 
statistical data only partly captures the investment flows (Libman and Kheyfets, 2006) – 
hence, the investment interdependence may be even higher (Libman, 2009).  
An over-optimistic assessment of the regionalization process in Central Asia would be 
premature. The current financial crisis, which seems to have an enormous impact on post-
Soviet economies, is likely to shift the investment flows in the region. It is particularly 
important for Kazakhstan, which based its international investment expansion on a large and 
well-developed banking sector, which also turns out to be the most vulnerable element of the 
economy of the country during the crisis. It is also clear that the international activity of 
multinationals from Kazakhstan depended heavily on the economic growth in this country, 
which demonstrated enormous performance since 2000, but also suffered a lot during the 
crisis. Hence, the next few years should demonstrate whether the model of interaction 
described in this paper will survive. 
The second element of the cross-border regionalization in Central Asia is based on a 
much more stable foundation (although profited a lot from economic growth of the last 
decade), since its basic elements could be found even in the archaic economies – the existence 
of informal trade networks, once again, only partly covered by statistics. Spechler (2000:7) 
claims that “with all the problems, informal trade among the Central Asian countries appears 
to be working reasonably well”. Informal trade seems to be important for countries like 
Tajikistan (Olimova et al., 2006) and even Turkmenistan in spite of strong trade restrictions 
(in particular across the border with Uzbekistan) (Badykova, 2006). An additional force 
supporting the regionalization and the development of informal networks in the region is 
labor migration: Kazakhstan, once again, acts partly as a regional leader attracting migrants 
and even competing with Russia in this respect (Schmitz, 2009:15). The informal trade 
networks seem to be somehow valid as well in terms of “sufficient” conditions for market 
integration: Grafe et al. (2005) show that the impact of border on price variation between 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan is relatively small and practically equivalent to 
the intranational price variation between individual regions. 
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The regionalization within individual countries in Central Asia is even more difficult 
to assess than the cross-border regionalization. One could certainly expect this process to be 
present in Kazakhstan, where the economy is dominated by large business groups.vii 
Moreover, since the most attractive export commodities (oil and metals) have been held by 
foreign investors (although their positions seem to be significantly weakened now, see 
Libman and Ushkalova, 2009), one could theoretically observe a stronger interest of domestic 
business groups to explore internal market. However, unlike Russia, where regionalization 
indeed became a significant factor supporting reduction of transaction-costs barriers (Libman, 
2007), there is at least currently no empirical evidence supporting that for Kazakhstan; there 
is even less information regarding other countries of the region. viii 
 To conclude, different channels of market integration seem to provide different 
outcomes in terms of “necessary” potential. Given the limited information on domestic 
regionalization and virtually absent unilateral liberalization, the most interesting comparison 
could be reduced to two pairs of models. In the international context, it seems to be puzzling 
that the regionalization outperforms regionalism so significantly. Comparing international 
and internal models, the really interesting puzzle is why in de-facto recentralization of 2000s 
after the period of informal decentralization in the 1990s was not accompanied by respective 
increase of international policy coordination. Finally, one may be wondering whether 
regionalization and centralization influence each other. The next section deals specifically 
with these three issues. 
 
4. Divergence of models of integration 
4.1. International policy coordination and centralization 
 As the starting point in the discussion consider the interrelation of international policy 
coordination and centralization. On the one hand, different channels of market integration can 
be treated as independent observations in the sample. In this case, similar institutional, 
economic and political environment should generate similar outcomes in terms of 
effectiveness. Since all models are implemented in the same region with long history of 
interdependence of all countries, it is reasonable to assume that the environment for these 
models (even if one is considering international and domestic dimensions). The question is 
thus to find differences in terms of development of integration model, which could explain the 
divergence. The alternative point of view implies that models of integration, once 
implemented in the same region, are interrelated. In this case one can claim that one model 
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may turn out to be successful exactly because the other failed. In the first case one faces the 
classical MSDO situation (most similar with different outcomes). In the second case the very 
comparison of the models seems to be unreasonable: it makes more sense to look at them as a 
whole in order to understand their interrelations. 
Independence assumption: For the models of government-led integration in Central 
Asia the difference between these two approaches is straightforward. On the one hand, one 
could expect, that similar environment is likely to support both centralization within the 
country and international policy coordination. Hence, the research objective is to look for 
differences in the environment. One specific distinction seems to be at hand: while in the 
international relations one considers negotiations between sovereign states, i.e. government 
with well-established political property rights, in the domestic decentralization process 
political property rights of regional elites have mostly been of informal nature. It is clear that 
under changing economic environment (the start of economic growth of the 2000s) it is easier 
to re-define the informal property rights than to change the formal institutions – and therefore 
the internal power balance is likely to be less stable, than the international one.  
However, this claim does not really resolve the puzzle, but rather replaces it with an 
alternative one: why did regional elites on all Central Asian countries (even in cases when 
their autonomy was established in a civil war) did not protect their autonomy through 
establishing formal political property rights? On the other hand, the protection of political 
property rights in international relations is never perfect. In fact, there are multiple border 
disputes between Central Asian countries. The borders between countries in the region are 
weak at best (Olcott and Malashenko, 2000) and often artificially set by the Soviet “nation 
delimination” – and to a certain extend “nation creation” politics (Abashin, 2007; Farrant, 
2006). “National histories” created in individual countries often treat their common history in 
a completely different fashion (Gorak, 2009; Shnirelman, 2009). Just to provide one example 
of international relations in the region: in the 1990s Uzbekistan placed minefields at the 
border of then-unstable Tajikistan, in fact positioning them on the Tajikistan territory 
(Vardomskiy, 2009). So why did the international political property rights survive all changes 
in the economic development of the region over the last two decades?  
Informality of internal political property rights: The most important issue of 
informal decentralization is that it may act as a “substitute” for formal bargaining for both 
regional and central elites. Since opting-out (and secession) is not an option and the sides 
have to interact with each other, if there is high uncertainty about present and future 
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bargaining power, informality allowing for re-negotiation of the contracts may be more 
attractive. In fact, existence of “national-level” political interests and ambitions of regional 
leaders (e.g. in Kazakhstan in the 1990s) may as well prevent them from demanding more 
formal decentralization. In a world where regional interests are especially important for 
national-level politics (as in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyz Republic) this factor is 
particularly significant. The regional elites face a contradiction between “formalizing” their 
political property rights now and therefore increasing the stability of the current position, and 
decreasing size of the “pie” in the future, if they are able to gain control in the center – simply 
because in a decentralized country central authority is less important. The solution to this 
trade-off may as well imply absence of formal decentralization, if the expected utility of 
potential “prize” at the central level is high enough (Libman, 2009a). 
There are also several other factors to be mentioned. First, it may just be more 
convenient and “simple” option, given the decades of experience of informal bargaining in the 
region, and hence preferred by elites just because of path dependence factors. From this point 
of view the survival of old Soviet nomenklatura in the elites of the new independent states 
may have contributed to the predominantly informal patterns of decentralization. Second, 
informality is strongly supported by the central government. Formal decentralization 
obviously reduces the ability of the central government to gain back the lost influence. As 
already mentioned, informal decentralization is very close to the general approach of semi-
authoritarian regimes to maintain power monopoly in presence of limited resources.ix There 
are certain similarities between this argument and discussions in economics of transition. 
Formal decentralization in a country with high informal decentralization is similar to gaining 
formal property rights in an economy where informal property rights dominate (notice, that 
since all countries are de-jure highly centralized, no protection of formal “property rights” of 
the center is necessary even if the central government is weak). The problem of “spontaneous 
development of demand for property rights”, as mentioned, is far from being resolved in the 
post-Soviet world. Similar logic may be attributed to regional governments. Therefore even 
strong regional leads may prefer low formal decentralization. On the other hand, there is of 
course a possibility that informal decentralization leads to demand for formal decentralization 
from the side of strong regions (because of the factors described above), but here the main 
problem is the time horizon and “myopic” behavior of regional leaders and the offers of the 
central government in the bargaining process. Anyway, the current re-centralization phase in 
major countries of the region makes this question hypothetical, with the only exception of 
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Kyrgyz Republic, where the involvement of regional elites in central politics seems to prevent 
them from demanding formal devolution.  
At the stage of informal re-centralization (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) 
formal decentralization may become especially problematic, because it may trigger undesired 
informal power redistribution. Therefore the experience of informal decentralization in the 
past will limit the readiness of strong central governments to experiment with formal 
decentralization (or create extreme limits for these experiments). 
Stability of international political property rights: It seems reasonable to mention 
two potential factors of stability of international property rights. First, stability of international 
political property rights may be a result of informal consensus of regional leaders, based on 
the need to protect their power basis. In this case the explanation is similar to that of the 
stability of African borders. Indeed, some observers claim that this kind of informal 
consensus may exist in Central Asia (Allison, 2008), where regional cooperation takes form 
of joint support of autocratic political leaders. On the other hand, stability may also result 
from the complexity of power relations in Central Asia. The multitude of potential players, as 
well as the complexity of relations among them (Kazantsev, 2008) may also act as medium 
de-facto supporting stability of international political property rights.  
Interdependence assumption: An alternative explanation for the observed 
divergence of internal and international development may be simply the existence of 
interdependence between these two processes. In fact, one can argue that exactly the success 
of centralization within country makes international cooperation less likely. In a non- or semi-
authoritarian political system central elites are unlikely to restrict their power in form of 
international agreements, if possible (therefore the ability of non-democracies to establish 
formal integration is very limited, if there are no strong power asymmetries). Centralization of 
the spatial order of authority in these countries means as well increasing concentration of 
political power, and in this case “centralization” through “delegation of power” on 
international level, i.e. international policy coordination, is less attractive for national 
autocrats. Moreover, centralization restricts the ability of regions to implement autonomous 
measures in international politics, hence, once again, removing at least one possible channel 
for international policy coordination. Hence, it is possible to claim that the increasing (or 
constantly high) centralization of political authority in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan 
may become a factor limiting the development of regional integration. There seems to be a 
paradoxical reverse connection between increasing centralization in individual countries and 
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“centralization” (i.e. delegation of authorities through international cooperation) at the 
international level. 
 
4.2. Regionalization and regionalism 
In order to understand how regionalism and regionalization are interrelated, one has to 
clearly distinguish among two aspects of regionalization described above: informal trade 
networks and “investment led” regionalization based on large multionationals. From the point 
of view of the later, the most often stated argument is that economic dominance of 
Kazakhstan based on the investment expansion of its corporations can become a factor 
supporting formal regionalism in its current form (once again, with Kazakhstan as the main 
actor). Regionalization can become an additional leverage mechanism. The increasing 
attention of the Kazakhstan government to the FDI activity in the Kyrgyz Republic confirms 
that at least these expectations are present at the level of the political decision makers. 
Nevertheless, international experience shows, that the asymmetric regionalization can have 
different impact on regionalism: while in Mexico the development of maquiladoras actually 
supported the formation of NAFTA, in the CIS significant presence of Russian investors in 
Ukraine did not support any formal integration between these two countries.  
Considering the link between investment-led regionalization and regionalism, one 
should not forget the potential importance of political institutions in the regional integration 
processes. As noted, most countries of the region are semi-authoritarian regimes, where 
governments use the design of economic institutions to restrict potential opposition. It is well 
known in the literature on international integration, that non-democracies are less likely to 
participate in the regional economic integration than democracies (Mansfield et al., 2002). In 
fact, that is what one can observe in Central Asia: in fact, the less democratic countries of the 
region (Turkmenistan and – to a lower extend – Uzbekistan) are also less likely to become 
part of integration agreements. The main problem is the issue of commitment: in a political 
system based on informal power balances it is extremely difficult to provide any commitment 
to an external actor, yet alone to give up part of the sovereignty (what is per definition implied 
by the regionalization). A question is of course whether regionalization can overcome these 
obstacles. Basically, there are two factors to be taken into consideration. First, regional 
cooperation can take form of the development of international hierarchies (Lake, 2007), and 
in this case is less dependent from the issue of democracy. An important aspect from this 
point of view is not just the existence of asymmetries, but the scope of asymmetries. Weak 
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asymmetry can in fact be even quite dangerous for regionalism: it increases mistrust, but does 
not provide any instruments for leverage. In fact, the political elites in Kyrgyz Republic have 
been quite cautious with respect to any potential integration with Kazakhstan. However, high 
political instability is a clear factor increasing the asymmetries and also the demand for 
international hierarchies. Second, the question is whether there is a clear link between 
investment expansion and governmental policies. Once again, in case of Russian investments 
in Ukraine businesses basically ignore the regionalism dimension. However, given a 
relatively high influence of consolidated political leadership in Kazakhstan on its business 
groups, one could in fact expect that the government will be able to influence the investment 
decisions following the logic of international politics. Hence, one can actually expect that in 
case of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic regionalization could support formal regionalism.x 
The main question is to certain extend: can Kazakhstan win where Russia (also using informal 
regionalization as an instrument of control for the first half of the 2000s) lost?   
Obviously, the scope of these projects mostly covers Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz 
Republic, and maybe Tajikistan (where the position of Russia is crucial). Uzbekistan has been 
quite reluctant to support regionalism in Central Asia (Bohr, 2004; Kuz’min, 2008), and in the 
current situation seems to prefer Russia to Kazakhstan as the main source of FDI, designing 
its investment policies respectively (Abalkina et al., 2007). The latter fact raises an important 
issue of competition between Central Asian regionalism projects and broader projects (with 
participation of Russia – EAEC – or China – Shanghai Cooperation Organization). And in 
this context development of regionalization can also be quite important: on the one hand, 
strong economic interconnections can make regional integration within Central Asia a 
priority; but on the other hand, it is possible, that at least some actors try to off-balance 
economic influence of Kazakhstan by the political influence of other actors (e.g. Russia). 
Theoretically, it is also reasonable to claim that the development of Central Asian regionalism 
is able to reinforce the regionalization, reducing the degree of political uncertainty and 
removing existing borders. The crucial factor is here whether the regionalism will move from 
rhetoric to implementation. The effects of pure rhetoric (as it has been so far in the field of 
regionalism in Central Asia) are ambiguous: it can both create necessary framework for 
public support of investment expansion (what seems to be the case for Kazakhstan-Kyrgyz 
Republic dyad (Kuz’min, 2008)), but also introduce political tensions in purely economic 
relations. 
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From the point of view of informal trade one can hardly expect any clear effects of 
regionalization on regionalism and vice versa. Informal trade supports the persistence of 
social integration and cross-border interpersonal networks, necessary for any integration 
project. On the other hand, increasing intergovernmental cooperation could theoretically shift 
the patterns of informal trade to formal trade by creating well-protected property rights and 
restricting rent-seeking of public officials through removing additional options for their 
decision-making (it is actually implied by any economic liberalization). From this point of 
view the very existence of informal trade is based on the lack of formal framework for 
cooperation – once again, very similar to the issue of the informal economy in general. 
Whether this degree of cooperation (and of quality of governance in general) can be achieved, 
is questionable. A reasonable point often mentioned by sociologists is that the real puzzle is 
not why some people prefer informal structures, but why there are people choosing the 
formalization of their transactions (Paneyakh, 2008). In a region with decades-old traditions 
of informal economy (in fact, flourishing even under late Soviet regime) even changes of 
formal institutions may have no effect on behavioral patterns for the actors. 
 
4.3. Decentralization and regionalization 
 The final aspect to be considered is the interaction between decentralization and 
regionalization. Does the existence of informal trade and development of FDI flows in Central 
Asia support or prevent formal (or informal) decentralization? And how does the informal 
decentralization (if present) influence the integration? Basically, the interaction between 
decentralization and regional integration should be considered from two points of view. On 
the one hand, from the point of view of the demand for decentralization, regional integration 
reduces the costs of autonomy and hence acts as a trigger for stronger decentralization. 
Unsurprisingly, political decentralization and economic integration are interrelated (Alesina 
and Spolaore, 2003). On the other hand, regional integration reduces the desire of central 
government to provide decentralization (supply side): first, the rents from the regions 
increase, and second, even for (possible) constant rents, the threat of secession also goes up 
(Friedman, 1977). The outcome may depend on the relative bargaining potential of both sides. 
In the countries experiencing stronger centralization (like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) the 
supply-side motive may become predominant (one may talk about “supply-driven markets for 
decentralization”). From this point of view development of informal cross-border linkages 
just creates an additional argument for central governments to restrict decentralization. On the 
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other hand, countries with weak central government may experience stronger devolution. It 
may be especially applicable for Kyrgyz Republic. Moreover, in Central Asia the concerns for 
territorial integrity are present in the political agenda of most countries. This is yet additional 
argument for central governments to support centralization in a world of informal integration 
– particularly in Central Asia, where, as already mentioned, borders are relatively weak.  
 One should not forget that there is also an additional aspect of decentralization in a 
world with weak democratic institutions – it often results in increasing provincial 
protectionism. This form of protectionism does not only hamper the internal trade, but may be 
problematic for trade between countries: for example, there are some claims that market 
access of countries of southern Central Asia to Russian markets was seriously impeded by the 
protectionist measures of regions in Kazakhstan in the 1990s, making transit through this 
country significantly more expensive (Kuang, 2009). From this point of view a different 
conclusion could be possible – re-centralization might be also helpful for expansion of 
informal trade. 
 
6. Implications for the balance of power in the region 
 The discussion so far revealed at least several factors, which may be able to influence 
the allocation of power in the region. First, re-centralization is certainly strongly interrelated 
with strengthening internal political power of elites, hence, reducing their desire to cooperate. 
Second, regionalization, on the other hand, supports cooperation serving as a potential source 
of “soft power” (which is certainly evident in case of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic). 
Third, regionalization, on the other hand, creates incentives for demand for decentralization, 
which, given the nature of Central Asian internal politics, is likely to result in reduced supply 
of decentralization, and therefore support further re-centralization.  
Hence, there seem to be two forces at play, each of them with partly contradicting 
effects. Stronger regionalization provides instruments of “soft power”, which can be used to 
create a more hierarchical structure of the region (by the way, similar instruments of “soft 
power” seem to be implemented by external actors like Russia and China). But, on the other 
hand, stronger regionalization combined with re-centralization increases the control of 
national elites over their territory, and hence reduces their readiness to accept even partial 
reduction of their decision space – therefore a transition towards more “horizontal” system of 
international relations in the region. Moreover, in this case re-centralization can, at least in the 
long run, undermine regionalization. For the last trend the relations between Tajikistan and 
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Russia are exemplarily: while Russia played an important role in stabilization of current 
political regime in Tajikistan in exchange for close economic and political ties, once 
achieving sufficient degree of stability, immediately limited access of Russian investors to its 
economy (the representative case of RUSAL’s participation in the reconstruction of Rogun 
Power Plant). 
To sum up, there are basically two chains of causality: (1) Regionalization (economic 
growth) and re-centralization → stronger elites → lower desire to cooperate → restrictions on 
regionalization, and (2) Regionalization → soft power → increasing concentration of power 
in the region → more formal cooperation (and even more regionalization?). The real question 
thus depends on the speed of two processes – internal re-allocation of power between central 
and regional elites, on the one hand, and regionalization, on the other. In case of relations 
between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic the latter obviously outperforms the former 
(especially because Kyrgyz Republic basically did not enter the “re-centralization” part of the 
cycle, and also because of the differences between these countries in terms of state capacity, 
see Cummings and Norgaard, 2004); however, in case of relations between Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan the domestic concentration of power develops much faster than any form of 
regionalization (especially given the absence of open markets in Uzbekistan). Current 
economic crisis, however, which seems to have a profound impact on the economy of 
Kazakhstan and its ability to expand abroad, may shift these trends. Nevertheless, the 
contradicting relation between (mutually interdependent) re-centralization within the 
countries and regionalization across their borders may play an important role in the 
development of the emerging power balance in Central Asia. 
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i
 Emergence of institutions as unintended results of intended action has been crucial for the Hayekian analysis of 
economic evolution. A focus on institutions as by-products of contest for power forms the core of what one may 
call “neorealist” approach to institutional change (Amable and Palombarini, 2009). Since the preferences are 
never directly observable (and even revealed preferences based on observations of choices are difficult to deduce 
in intransparent political settings), the analysis of by-products of power struggles has clear benefits for research. 
ii
 It should be noted, that the necessary precondition for the very consideration of the problem of market 
integration is, of course, the implementation of economic reforms, turning markets into (more or less) important 
media of coordination in the economy. In Turkmenistan the economy remained under governmental control, 
which seems to be even stronger, than in the Soviet Union (since for Turkmenistan 1990s in fact indicated the 
transition from weakening authoritarianism of the USSR to quasi-totalitarian system); in Uzbekistan market 
reforms also played a much smaller role, than in other countries. 
iii
 From the point of view of decentralization, it is well known that the formal distribution of authorities among 
levels of government does not necessarily represent the real equilibrium, developed through the interaction of 
bargaining power (Taylor, 2007). The informal decentralization represents a specific case of authority migration 
through encroachment, shirking, burden-shifting and other forms of opportunistic behavior (Bednar, 2004). 
iv
 It is difficult to find an example for intranational unilateral liberalization, since most modern states at least 
formally declare their desire to maintain free movement of goods and factors of production within their territory. 
v
 For example, in Russia the period of 1990s was characterized by substantial decentralization. To be more 
precise, even after establishment of the formal rules of a highly centralized federation in 1994 regional 
governments continued gaining independence through the quasi-constitutional system of power sharing treaties 
and unilateral actions like strategic tax collection and “war of laws” (Litwak, 2002; Libman and Feld, 2008). In a 
similar way, in Ukraine regional governments led by the presidents of regional councils (oblastnoi sovet) became 
influential players in the political system, and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea followed the Russian path of 
unilateral devolution (Turovskiy, 1999); the resulting “decentralized influence over revenue policy” seemed to 
be much higher than formal structures would suggest (Way, 2002). However, in the mid 1990s in Ukraine and in 
the 2000s in Russia the central governments effectively regained control over regional politics – though in 
Ukraine the process seems to be reversed by the orange revolution in the mid 2000s. 
vi
 These practices resemble the importance of regional interests in Ukraine, where the centralization is also often 
perceived as collusion of the center with individual regions (Solnick, 2002) and the current politics is strongly 
divided along regional lines, although the mechanism of formation of regional interests may be different.  
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vii
 A very short account of the development of government-business relations in Kazakhstan looks as follows: in 
the 1990s the corporate landscape was dominated by influential domestic companies, mostly with strong 
informal ties to political elites, but also (unlike most other CIS countries) by foreign multinationals, which in 
fact gained access to the most attractive assets in the economy. The early 2000s became the period of conflicts 
between domestic business and the government, not dissimilar to the Russian experience, which, as in Russia, 
resulted in strengthening the power of the political elites and were mostly resolved through a new round of 
informal bargaining rather than development of new formal rules. For example, M. Abliazov, an influential 
businessman and politician, was first sentenced to prison, but later released and subsequently appointed president 
of one of the largest banks in Kazakhstan, TuranAlem. Interestingly, he lost this position during the re-
nationalization of the bank during the crisis of 2008/09, to a certain extend setting a mark of final transition 
between models of government-business relations: from informal dominance in relations with domestic 
companies and open doors to multinationals in the 1990s to gradual expansion of the government in the second 
half of the 2000s, which did not take the forms of re-nationalization, like in Russia, but still implies the extensive 
growth of public sector, stronger control over public assets and particularly increasing obstacles for activity of 
previously powerful multinationals. During the second half of the 1990s domestic business in Kazakhstan, as in 
all post-Soviet countries, moved from complete dominance of informal relations to a more institutionalized form 
of governance. In Russia this process was facilitated by the generational change at the top of the business 
community from founders to hired managers – a process, which, according to several reports, is reversed by the 
current crisis of 2008-2009 (when the companies start cutting hired management and replacing them by 
shareholders in order to optimize the cost structure). We are not aware of similar evidence from Kazakhstan, but 
in this case a stronger force was the process of internationalization and also impact of multinationals. 
Nevertheless, the crisis of 2007-2009 hit the economy of Kazakhstan very hard (due to the significantly more 
developed financial institutions, than in most other countries of the CIS), and may imply changes in the 
government-business relations model. 
viii
 The problem is probably part of the general discussion of the influence of private business on the emergence 
of “good” institutions in the post-Soviet space. There are basically three channels to be discussed: direct power 
asymmetries and design of institutions by incumbents; institutions as by-product of power struggles and 
influence of inconsistency of institutions on the overall institutional quality. The key parameter of discussion is 
the so-called demand for bad institutions: large businesses support inefficient institutional equilibria due to a 
variety of reasons. This situation may also be considered from the point of view of development of integrated 
markets: demand for bad institutions may also be associated with demand for provincial protectionism. The 
simple existence of demand for bad institutions in the early 1990s is hardly debated in the modern literature (and 
in fact at least for Russia there is evidence of demand for provincial protectionism from business groups). 
Nevertheless, the account of possible changes of business preferences remains one of the key issues for transition 
studies. Havrylyshin (2007:17) refers to this discussion as “transition inevitable” and “transition frozen” school 
of thoughts and claims, that “the debate … will certainly go on for some time to come”. Anyway, depending 
upon the answer to this question, two alternative approaches could be deduced.  The first is that the demand for 
good institutions theory assumes important changes in business’ preferences towards good institutions at later 
stages of transition as opposed to the early asset-stripping period: private corporations become interested in 
improvements of institutional environment. Hence, improving the quality of institutions is possible if business 
groups are powerful. Similar results could be expected if the driving force of institutional transition is the 
powerful multinationals, which may be free from the demand for bad institutions bias. According to the second 
approach, since business still prefers bad institutions, the main source of institutional innovations is the state 
(i.e., political actors), which forces private businesses to accept new rules (if it is able to do so). In this case, 
however, political economics considerations should be taken into account. Analogous to the “demand for bad 
institutions” vs. “demand for good institutions” contradiction, one can formulate the “autonomous government” 
vs. “rent-seeking government” contradiction. The impartial government approach claims that relatively strong 
government is free from potential interest groups pressure and hence produces better institutions. The particular 
definition of impartiality is subject to debate:  the older view focuses on the independence of government from 
the redistributive desires of interest groups, which makes it able to implement economic reforms (see also Kjaer 
and Hansen, 2002, for critical discussion of relation of state capacity and governmental autonomy), while the 
more recent ideas focus on impartiality of the government in the long run (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). The 
opposite point of view claims that governments which are independent are rarely impartial and usually just use 
their power to extract rents. Even in this case powerful government is able to trigger better institutions, if one 
follows the logic of the “stationary bandit” argument in the sense of McGuire and Olson (1996), i.e. existence of 
higher benefits from economic growth, than from more intensive redistribution. This argument is, however, 
strongly linked to the time horizon of the dictators, which is usually claimed to be very short in the post-Soviet 
space. In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, with more stable political regimes, time horizon may be longer; however, 
as Chaturvedi and Muenster (2009) claim, even in this case a model of conflict between the dictator and his 
23 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
successor may generate more extractive policies of the former if the shadow of the future is long enough. From 
this point of view the increasing power of the autonomous government, if it is not rent-seeking or if it behaves as 
Olsonian stationary bandit, may support promotion of good institutions and hence integration of markets. 
ix
 It has long been noticed that corruption and graft (as well as all kinds of informal connections) may in fact 
strengthen the administrative hierarchy, serving as an additional institute of control (see Darden, 2008). Informal 
decentralization is per definition based on informal networks and very often involves the emergence of 
extremely corrupt regimes – and hence, be in vested interest of central government as a tool for potential re-
centralization. In fact, in this case informal decentralization seems to undermine itself, because it creates an 
additional tool (corruption networks) which can be used to strengthen the formal hierarchy. 
x
 It is important to notice, that the main players in the economy of Kazakhstan are, though highly connected to 
the government, still private businesses. There is no trend towards wide-scope nationalization in Kazakhstan, as 
it was observed in Russia. This is an additional argument in favor of the regionalism projects: in case of 
dominance of state-owned enterprises regionalization can effectively become just another form of 
intergovernmental contacts, making any form of further cooperation meaningless (Vinokurov, 2007). 
